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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over “affirmative consent” suffers from conceptual
confusion and unwarranted assumptions. This Article seeks to clarify the
concept of affirmative consent and dispel mistaken assumptions. In its most
basic form, affirmative consent is a relatively modest reform that has already
taken root, either overtly or sub silentio, in many American jurisdictions.1
Affirmative consent does not offer the significant reform that some of its
advocates desire nor present the dire risks many of its opponents fear.2
This Article makes the following points:
* Joseph C. Hostetler–BakerHostetler Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. Thanks to Arnold Loewy and the Texas Tech Law Review student editors for
organizing this symposium. Thanks to participants in the AALS Symposium: Violence Against Women
at the 2016 American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting as well as to the participants
in the 2015 North East Ohio Faculty Colloquium for their valuable feedback on some of the ideas in this
Article.
1. See infra Section III.E.
2. See infra Part III (discussing misconceptions about affirmative consent).
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 The phrase “yes means yes” is a slogan (perhaps a good one),
not an actual legal standard or an explanation of a legal standard.
 Affirmative consent does not require “express verbal
agreement.”
 Many advocates and critics assume that affirmative consent
necessarily means “unambiguous consent” when, in fact, it does not.
Some affirmative consent policies additionally require that consent be
unambiguous, but many do not. This is a major distinction and one that
has been ignored in the debate over affirmative consent. Unambiguous
consent represents a significant change in the law whereas affirmative
consent does not.
 Commentators state that affirmative consent changes the legal
standard from one that requires an affirmative “no” to one that requires
an affirmative “yes.” In fact, this change has been underway for decades
as courts have steadily abandoned and rejected any rule that requires
even “verbal resistance”—a clear “no.” This is an important but
incremental shift and has already occurred in most jurisdictions,
regardless of whether the jurisdiction invokes the concept of affirmative
consent.
 Commentators suggest that affirmative consent policies
change the significance of silence or passivity in rape cases. Some
suggest that in the past, silence or passivity was equated with consent
whereas under affirmative consent, it is not. The first claim—silence or
passivity equals consent—was true in the past but is no longer true, at
least as a doctrinal matter, in most jurisdictions today.3 The second
claim—silence or passivity does not show consent under affirmative
consent policies—suffers from a critical ambiguity.4 The more
plausible resolution of that ambiguity shows silence and passivity play
largely the same role under an affirmative consent policy as they do
under existing law—namely, that silence or passivity is relevant but not
sufficient standing alone to show the presence of consent.
At the heart of many of these confusions are unexplained and unjustified
assumptions about how human communication works.5 Both advocates and
critics of affirmative consent policies seem to share the misperception that
parties to sexual encounters commonly fail to communicate to each other
their agreement to engage in sex.6 Of course, parties to sexual encounters
routinely communicate with one another in ways that are indirect, subtle, and
nonverbal, but they are communicating nonetheless (not always
3. See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text (suggesting that the jurisdictions that equate
silence with consent are outliers).
4. See infra notes 151–53 and accompanying text (noting that ambiguity results from policies that
do not make it clear that silence does not indicate consent).
5. See infra Section III.F.
6. See infra Section III.F.
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successfully).7 In the vast majority of sexual encounters—including the vast
majority of those contested encounters involving an allegation of rape or
sexual assault—some affirmative signal or signals are sent between the
parties.8 Accordingly, requiring that consent be affirmative—that some
positive signal be sent—will impact relatively few cases, and many of those
cases are already successfully prosecuted under existing law.9
The main difficulty in many contested cases of rape or sexual assault is
how to interpret various signals—verbal and nonverbal—sent between the
parties to the encounter. The dispute is not over whether a signal was sent at
all, and thus, requiring affirmative consent does not assist with or change that
difficult task. That is because the problem is not in determining whether
some affirmative signal was sent but in determining whether the combination
of words and conduct, on balance and in context, indicated agreement to sex.
This Article aims to “unpack” the concept of affirmative consent by
identifying common assertions about affirmative consent that are false or
misleading and by separating issues that are commonly conflated. The goal
here is not to advocate either for or against the notion of affirmative consent
but to clarify the concept to show what is at stake (and what is not at stake)
in these debates.
Part II of this Article sets forth definitions of affirmative consent,
particularly noting the difference between policies that require unambiguous
agreements and those that do not. Part III addresses the various
misconceptions identified above. Section III.A discusses the “yes means
yes” slogan. Section III.B notes that affirmative consent does not mean
express verbal agreement. Section III.C explains that affirmative consent is
different from unambiguous consent. Section III.D discusses the shift from
“no means no” to “yes means yes,” noting that this change in the law has
already occurred in most jurisdictions, regardless of whether the jurisdiction
uses the term “affirmative consent.” Section III.E discusses the role of
silence under affirmative consent policies, analyzing a significant ambiguity
on this point. Section III.F seeks to dispel the perception that in many sexual
encounters, the parties fail to indicate their interest in sex.
II. DEFINITIONS OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
The concept of affirmative consent carries with it a cluster of both
substantive rules (related to the definition of consent) and procedural rules
(related to how criminal prosecutions or university adjudications should be
conducted).10 This Article focuses on the former, not the latter—examining
7. See infra Section III.F.
8. See infra Section III.F.
9. See infra Section III.F.
10. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform,
125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1946 (2016) (discussing the developments of both the procedural and substantive
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the substantive concept of affirmative consent, not analyzing the various
procedural rules that might go along with such a standard.11
Rape law has long contained a consent element.12 Most American
jurisdictions do not use the concept of affirmative consent to describe the
consent element, although a few do. In the 1992 M.T.S. decision, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted its state law to require “freely given
affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration.”13 A few
other states have statutory definitions that likewise require affirmative
consent.14
The concept of affirmative consent has spread much more rapidly in the
context of higher education. Hundreds of college and university policies now
include some definition of affirmative consent as a component of their
university sexual assault policies.15
Definitions of affirmative consent vary somewhat, but they can be
categorized conceptually into two main groups: those that require some
affirmative signal of consent and those that additionally require that consent
be unambiguous or clearly expressed.
components of affirmative consent policies); Wendy Adele Humphrey, “Let’s Talk About Sex”:
Legislating and Educating on the Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 41 (2016)
(discussing both procedural and substantive issues in affirmative consent policies).
11. Several procedural issues are under consideration in connection with university affirmative
consent policies. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 10, at 39–40. To give just one example, there is
considerable debate over whether universities should use a preponderance of the evidence standard in
sexual assault cases or whether the standard should be higher. Id. at 46 (“[S]ome have criticized the
preponderance of the evidence standard for being too low when determining a claim of sexual violence
on campus, others maintain that the standard is appropriate . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Anderson, supra
note 10 (defending the preponderance standard on the ground that it is the ordinary standard for university
disciplinary adjudications); Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault Allegations, Adjudications, and
Title IX, 39 CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16, 16 (“[T]he school reaction is a process in which human rights
are often sacrificed by collegiate bureaucrats. Campus sexual assaults are a serious issue deserving of
appropriate investigation and adjudication, but institutions of higher learning should not implement
Alice-in-Wonderland techniques.”); Allison L. Marciniak, Note, The Case Against Affirmative Consent:
Why the Well-Intentioned Legislation Dangerously Misses the Mark, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 51, 67 (2015).
12. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210 (noting that rape is the “carnal knowledge
of a woman forcibly and against her will”).
13. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (“Such permission can be indicated either
through words or through actions that, when viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances,
would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given authorization for the specific act
of sexual penetration.”).
14. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11–1.70(a) (West 2012) (“‘Consent’ means a freely given
agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical
resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused
shall not constitute consent.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2007) (“‘Consent’ means
that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(4) (West 2013) (defining consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact”).
15. Humphrey, supra note 10, at 57 (“[A]ccording to the National Center for Higher Education Risk
Management, more than 800 colleges have adopted a policy based on a consent-based model and have
included a definition of affirmative consent in their sexual assault policies.”) (footnotes omitted).
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A. Affirmative Consent
In the M.T.S. case, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained affirmative
consent as follows:
In a case such as this one, in which the State does not allege violence or
force extrinsic to the act of penetration, the factfinder must decide whether
the defendant’s act of penetration was undertaken in circumstances that led
the defendant reasonably to believe that the alleged victim had freely given
affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration. Such
permission can be indicated either through words or through actions that,
when viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, would
demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given
authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration. 16

Beyond the term “affirmative permission” and the clarification that such
permission could be indicated either through words or conduct, the court did
not further define the concept. Several other American jurisdictions use a
similar standard.17
Federal action has come from the Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) in the context of enforcing Title IX’s prohibitions on sex
discrimination in higher education.18 The OCR issued a 2011 “Dear
Colleague Letter,” providing guidance to universities on sexual assault
policies and procedures.19 The Dear Colleague Letter explained that “a
school’s responsibility [is] to respond promptly and effectively to sexual
violence against students in accordance with the requirements of Title IX.”20
Notably, neither the Dear Colleague Letter nor a 2014 “Questions and
Answers” document uses the phrase “affirmative consent” or sets forth an
affirmative consent standard.21 Instead, the Dear Colleague Letter describes

16. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1278 (footnote omitted).
17. See supra note 14 (detailing several state statutes).
18. For a description of the origins of the affirmative consent standard in relation to Title IX,
including the role of the OCR and the White House Task Force on Protecting Students from Sexual
Assault, see Humphrey, supra note 10, at 41–54, and Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay
on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387,
393–94 (2015).
19. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn
Ali, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.
pdf (addressing sexual violence as a form of sexual harassment under Title IX).
20. Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
21. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978 (“OCR has so far declined to enter the substantive
conversations about how to define sexual assault on college campuses. However, at the same time that
OCR was stepping up enforcement of Title IX against sexually hostile environments at colleges and
universities, many campuses adopted affirmative consent standards to govern sexual behavior.”).
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procedures for handling sexual assault complaints but does not itself mandate
an affirmative consent standard.22
In 2014, the White House Task Force on Protecting Students from
Sexual Assault issued a report titled “Not Alone.”23 The Task Force also
released a “Checklist for Campus Sexual Misconduct Policies.”24 This
checklist (unlike the Dear Colleague Letter) specifically includes an
affirmative consent standard.25 The checklist states that a definition of
consent should recognize, at a minimum, that:
•
•
•
•
•

consent is a voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity;
someone who is incapacitated cannot consent;
past consent does not imply future consent;
silence or an absence of resistance does not imply consent;
consent to engage in sexual activity with one person does not imply
consent to engage in sexual activity with another;
• consent can be withdrawn at any time; and
• coercion, force, or threat of either invalidates consent.26

California has adopted an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault
policies at its state universities.27 The California legislative definition is the
following:
An affirmative consent standard in the determination of whether consent
was given by both parties to sexual activity. “Affirmative consent” means
affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual
activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual
activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or
others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does
not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must
be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time.
The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the
fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be
assumed to be an indicator of consent.28

22. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 24–26 (discussing ways to handle sexual violence).
23. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE
FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT i, 2
(2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_0.pdf.
24. White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, Checklist for Campus Sexual
Misconduct Policies, DEP’T JUST. 1, 4, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/910271/download.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4–5.
27. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California
Education Code).
28. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2014).
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Many universities around the country similarly define affirmative consent to
mean an “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in
sexual activity.”29
The Affirmative Consent Project, a nonprofit organization devoted to
combating and preventing sexual assault and violence on college campuses
and elsewhere, states, “‘Affirmative consent’ means affirmative, conscious,
and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity.”30
The American Law Institute (ALI) is currently considering revisions to
the rape and sexual assault provisions of the Model Penal Code.31 The
discussion draft dated April 28, 2015 included an affirmative consent
provision defined as follows: “‘Consent’ means a person’s positive
agreement, communicated by either words or actions, to engage in a specific
act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.”32
Most of these definitions share the common thread of requiring that
consent be given affirmatively. Notably, none of these definitions expressly
require that the affirmative consent must also be unambiguous.33
B. Affirmative, Unambiguous Consent
A number of university policies go further than the standards set forth
above and also include language requiring that affirmative consent be
unambiguous or clear.

29. Tara Culp-Ressler, What ‘Affirmative Consent’ Actually Means, THINKPROGRESS (June 25,
2014),
https://thinkprogress.org/what-affirmative-consent-actually-means-ea665b32b388#.djhqh85j4;
see, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-120-024(20)(c)(i) (2016) (“‘Consent’ means that at the time of and
throughout the sexual contact, there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement
between the parties to engage in the sexual contact.”); GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE,
GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR STUDENTS 4, 7 (rev. ed. 2016),
www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresforStudents.pdf#page=9
(requiring affirmative consent for all sexual contact and stating that “[a]ffirmative consent is a knowing,
voluntary, and mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual activity”); UNIV. OF HAW.,
INTERIM POLICY AND PROCEDURE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 7 (2015),
http://hawaii.edu/policy/docs/temp/ep1.204.pdf (“Consent is affirmative, conscious, and voluntary
agreement to engage in agreed upon forms of sexual contact.”); UNIV. OF TENN., POLICY ON SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT, RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND RETALIATION 7 (2016), http://sexualassault
.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2015/08/sexual_misconduct_policy.pdf (“Consent is an affirmative
and voluntary agreement by a person to engage in a specific sexual act.”).
30. What Is Affirmative Consent?, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT PROJECT, affirmativeconsent.com/
whatisaffirmativeconsent/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
31. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
32. Id. This draft has since been withdrawn. See Kevin Cole, Backpedalling in Place: The ALI’s
Move from “Affirmative” to “Contextual” Consent, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript
at 3–4) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714057##).
33. Cole argues that the ALI Discussion Draft’s use of the term “positive agreement” creates an
ambiguity as to whether that agreement must be signaled clearly and unambiguously. See Kevin Cole,
Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert Negligence, and Other Difficulties of
“Affirmative Consent” in the ALI’s Draft Sexual Assault Provisions, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670419).
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For example, the University of Minnesota’s policy defines affirmative
consent as “informed, freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to
participate in sexual activity that is expressed by clear and unambiguous
words or actions.”34 The Yale University policy requires a “positive,
unambiguous, and voluntary agreement to engage in specific sexual activity
throughout a sexual encounter. Consent cannot be inferred from the absence
of a ‘no’; a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or otherwise, is necessary.”35 Other universities
similarly use language requiring unambiguous consent.36
Some universities first define affirmative consent without reference to a
clear or unambiguous requirement but then go on in a later section or sentence
to add that requirement.
For example, New York’s policy for state universities begins with
language very similar to California’s: “Affirmative consent is a knowing,
voluntary, and mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual
activity.”37 This language does not include a requirement that consent be
unambiguous—a notable shift given that an earlier draft of the policy did
expressly require a clear, unambiguous agreement.38 However, in the next
sentence, the New York policy adds that “[c]onsent can be given by words
or actions, as long as those words or actions create clear permission regarding

34. Id.
35. Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, Sexual Misconduct Response, YALE
UNIV., smr.yale.edu/sexual-misconduct-policies-and-definitions (last updated May 10, 2016).
36. UNIV. OF COLO., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY STATEMENT: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 5 (2015),
https://www.cu.edu/sites/defaults/files/5014.pdf (University of Colorado’s policy) (“Affirmative consent:
Means the unambiguous and voluntary agreement to engage in a specific sexual activity. Consent is clear,
knowing and voluntary words or actions which create mutually understandable clear permission regarding
willingness to engage in, and the conditions of, sexual activity. Consent must be active; silence by itself
cannot be interpreted as consent.”); UNIV. OF FLA., REGULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
4.041(4)(b)(3) (2012), http://regulations.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/4041.pdf (University of
Florida’s policy) (“Consent is given by an affirmative verbal response or acts that are unmistakable in
their meaning.”); UNIV. OF MICH., THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY AND PROCEDURES ON
STUDENT SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
15 (2016), https://publicaffairs.vpcomm.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2016/04/SMP-Finalmaster-version-4.6.16.pdf (University of Michigan’s policy) (“Consent is a clear and unambiguous
agreement, expressed outwardly through mutually understandable words or actions, to engage in a
particular activity.”); Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to Title IX,
DUKE POLICIES, http://policies.duke.edu/students/universitywide/sexualmisconduct.php (last updated
Aug. 1, 2016) (Duke University’s policy) (“Consent is an affirmative decision to engage in mutually
acceptable sexual activity freely given by clear actions or words.”); Sexual Assault, U. OR., https://safe.
uoregon.edu/sexual-assault (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (University of Oregon’s policy) (“‘Explicit
consent’ . . . means voluntary, non-coerced and clear communication indicating a willingness to engage
in a particular act. ‘Explicit consent’ includes an affirmative verbal response or voluntary acts
unmistakable in their meaning.”).
37. Definition of Affirmative Consent, ST. U.N.Y., http://system.suny.edu/sexual-violenceprevention-workgroup/policies/affirmative-consent/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).
38. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, SUNY POLICIES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE DECEMBER 1, 2014, REDLINED AGAINST NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATION, JUNE 2015, at 3
(2015),
http://system.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/sexualviolenceprevention/sunypolicies-sexual-violence-prevention-response-updated-Jun2015.pdf.
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willingness to engage in the sexual activity.”39 This seems to add a
requirement that the agreement not only be affirmative but also that it be
clear, which is a different concept. This type of policy poses some
interpretive challenges as the second sentence purports to simply clarify the
first but does so by adding a substantially new and different requirement.
This discussion does not represent an exhaustive catalogue of all the
affirmative consent policies in American universities, but it provides an
illustrative sample of how universities define the concept.
III. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
The ongoing debate over affirmative consent is complicated by the fact
that commentators often make unwarranted assumptions about the
conceptual issues at play in affirmative consent reforms. This Article seeks
to clarify the concept of affirmative consent and dispel several unfounded
assumptions.
A. “Yes Means Yes” Is a Slogan, Not a Legal Standard
The catchphrase of affirmative consent is “yes means yes.” This is a
slogan, not a legal standard.
Commentators regularly affiliate the concept of affirmative consent
with the phrase “yes means yes.”40 Janet Napolitano, the president of the
University of California system, summed up her adoption of an affirmative
consent policy for the University of California by explaining, “Put simply,
only yes means yes.”41
Taken as a slogan, “yes means yes” seems a worthwhile and valuable
educational tool. The “yes means yes” slogan is designed to encourage all
parties to a sexual encounter (particularly college students, at whom much of
the advocacy is aimed) to make sure that their partner has freely indicated
that he or she wants to have sex.42 It is designed to discourage persons from
assuming that consent is present unless their partner objects and instead to
encourage them to get an affirmative signal of agreement.43
An educational slogan is not the same thing as a legal standard,
however, and “yes means yes” is the former, not the latter. First, none of the

39. Definition of Affirmative Consent, supra note 37.
40. See Napolitano, supra note 18, at 389–90.
41. Id. at 390.
42. See id.; Jaclyn Friedman, Adults Hate ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws. The College Students I Meet Love
Them., WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/14/
adults-hate-affirmative-consent-laws-the-college-students-i-meet-love-them/; Jennifer Medina, Sex Ed
Lesson: ‘Yes Means Yes,’ but It’s Tricky, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/15/us/california-high-schools-sexual-consent-classes.html.
43. See Medina, supra note 42.
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affirmative consent policies actually define affirmative consent as “only yes
means yes.”
If it were a legal standard, the claim that “only yes means yes” could not
be taken literally. None of the existing affirmative consent standards require
participants in sexual activity to use the word “yes.” Thus, the claim that
“only yes means yes” does not mean that consent can be signaled only by
using the term “yes.”
Another possible interpretation of “yes means yes” is that an agreement
to sex must be signaled by some words or conduct that are the equivalent of
a “yes.” Not many affirmative consent policies actually state this, but a few
do. Yale’s policy states that “a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or otherwise, is
necessary.”44
Here, it is important to separate the following two ideas, discussed at
greater length in Section III.C: an affirmative indication of agreement versus
an unambiguous indication of agreement. The Yale policy requires both;
many policies only require the former.45 “Yes means yes,” as a legal
standard, would not require that the indication of agreement be unambiguous,
only that it be present.46
Finally, as noted in the following Section, affirmative consent policies
recognize that the affirmative signal of agreement to sex does not have to be
verbal but can be expressed through conduct or words.
The point here is not to criticize the phrase “yes means yes” but to clarify
what purpose it serves. It is a slogan and may be an effective slogan and
public relations tool.47 It is not, however, the actual legal standard or legal
definition of affirmative consent. Discussions of affirmative consent would
benefit from clarity on this point.
B. Affirmative Consent Does Not Mean “Express Verbal Agreement”
Most legal commentators recognize that an affirmative consent standard
does not require an express verbal agreement. Michelle Anderson, defending
the concept, has noted that affirmative consent can include “verbal or
nonverbal agreement.”48 Janet Halley, criticizing the concept, has likewise
recognized that California’s standard “does not require express consent,
consent in words” but presumably includes consent “given by conduct.”49 A
recent ALI draft of an affirmative consent proposal provided that consent
constituted a “positive agreement, communicated by either words or

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, supra note 35.
Id.
See infra Section III.C.
See Medina, supra note 42.
Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978.
Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42 SIGNS CURRENTS (2015).
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actions.”50 The commentary noted that “[s]ome scholars have urged a
requirement of explicit verbal assent,” but it concluded that this standard
“finds no support in existing law and departs too far from current social
practice.”51 The draft thus “recognizes the social reality that consensual
sexual encounters quite frequently are not preceded by an explicit verbal
‘yes.’”52 New Jersey’s M.T.S. decision, one of the earliest legal sources of
an affirmative consent standard, noted that affirmative consent “can be
indicated either through words or through actions.”53
While legal commentators appear to appreciate this point, some
journalists and advocates state or strongly imply that affirmative consent
requires express verbal agreement. A New York Magazine feature on the sex
lives of college students claimed affirmative consent meant “every step
toward sex being explicitly agreed to with a ‘yes.’”54 One of the California
law’s cosponsors stated that the California bill means that individuals “must
say ‘yes.’”55
It is easy enough to require express verbal consent if that is the goal—
sexual assault can simply be defined as engaging in sexual conduct without
express verbal consent. Antioch College received considerable attention in
the early 1990s for adopting a policy that did, in fact, require express verbal
consent at each stage of a sexual encounter.56 This approach was heavily
criticized and was not adopted by many other schools or jurisdictions.57 None
of the current affirmative consent policies contain this requirement.

50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
51. Id. § 213.0 cmt. 3.
52. Id.
53. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
54. Lauren Kern & Noreen Malone, College Sex 2015: An Introduction, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 18, 2015,
9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/10/sex-lives-of-college-students.html.
55. Josh Dulaney, Students Question ‘Affirmative Consent’ Bill Designed to Combat Sexual
Assaults, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (June 8, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/governmentand-politics/20140608/students-question-affirmative-consent-bill-designed-to-combat-sexual-assaults
(discussing the statement of Assemblywoman Bonnie Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) on a draft version of
the California legislation).
56. Robert Shibley, Antioch’s Infamous Sexual Assault Policy, FOUND. INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.
(June 15, 2007), https://www.thefire.org/antiochs-infamous-sexual-assault-policy/ (“Consent is defined
as the act of willingly and verbally agreeing to engage in specific sexual conduct.”); see Phil McCombs,
Taking a Look at Love, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/
1996/02/16/taking-a-look-at-love/185120d7-78d5-426e-bab9-ad4cf2b50483/ (quoting ANTIOCH COLL.,
SEXUAL OFFENSE POLICY (1992)).
57. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 179, 204 (2004)
(“The most vitriolic criticisms of attempts to define consent have been reserved for the Antioch College
Sexual Offense Policy.”).
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C. Affirmative Consent Is Different from “Unambiguous Consent”
The most pervasive misunderstanding of affirmative consent is the
notion that affirmative consent necessarily means “unambiguous
consent.” This is mistaken. Affirmative does not mean unambiguous.
Most affirmative consent policies do not require clear and unambiguous
consent, but some of them do. This is a major difference, which has gone
largely unnoticed in the literature. Requiring unambiguous consent
represents a major change to existing sexual assault law or university
policies. Simply requiring affirmative consent does not.
Dictionary definitions of “affirmative” do not support interpreting that
word to mean “unambiguous” or “unequivocal.” Random House’s
definitions of affirmative as an adjective include:
1. affirming or asserting the truth, validity, or fact of something
2. expressing agreement or consent . . . .
3. positive; not negative
....
7. a manner or mode that indicates assent . . . .58
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines affirmative
(adjective) as follows:
[1.] CONFIRMATIVE, RATIFYING
[2.] asserting a predicate of a subject or of a part of a
subject also : asserting the truth or validity of a statement . . .
contrasted with negative
[3.a.] asserting that the fact is so : declaratory of what
exists . . . .59
None of the various definitions indicate that affirmative means
unambiguous or unequivocal.
In the context of affirmative consent, the term affirmative seems to
require some active signal of agreement rather than the absence of an express
“no.” Thus, Michelle Anderson explained that
[a]ffirmative consent is the notion that mere passivity or acquiescence to the
will of another does not constitute meaningful permission to engage in
sexual penetration. Meaningful consent must be active, and a person should

58. Affirmative, RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2010).
59. Affirmative, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002).
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have to communicate positive, verbal or nonverbal agreement to engage in
penetration before someone else should be allowed to penetrate them. 60

The contrast here is between some affirmative (or positive) signal versus
inferring consent from the absence of any signal (or passivity).61 This is not
the same thing as requiring the affirmative signal also be unequivocal or very
clear.
Wisconsin law requires that consent be affirmative—“an affirmative
indication of willingness”—but there is no language in the statute or the case
law suggesting that affirmative consent must be clear or unambiguous.62 The
same is true in New Jersey—consent must be expressed affirmatively, but
there is no case law suggesting that affirmative consent must be clear or
unambiguous.63
Canada likewise has an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault
cases requiring “that the complainant had affirmatively communicated by
words or conduct her agreement to engage in sexual activity.”64 At least one
commentator characterized this as requiring communication that is “express,
explicit, and unambiguous.”65 But the Canadian case law, like that of
Wisconsin and New Jersey, does not appear to contain this additional
requirement that the consent be unambiguous.66

60. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978.
61. Id.
62. State v. Prineas, 2012 WI App 2, ¶ 16, 338 Wis. 2d 362, 373, 809 N.W.2d 68, 74 (quoting State
v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶ 31, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 107, 765 N.W.2d 557, 564–65); see also WIS. STAT ANN.
§ 940.225(4) (West 2013).
63. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 268–69 (N.J. 2003) (“Both the Code’s provisions with respect to
rape and the Rape Shield Law were intended to protect rape victims while defining the permissible
restrictions on a defendant’s attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of the defendant’s alleged belief
that the victim has given affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration charged in the
indictment.”).
64. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, para. 49 (Can.).
65. Lucinda Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent in Canadian Law, Jurisprudence, and Legal
Theory, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 395, 402 (2012) [hereinafter Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent
in Canadian Law]. In another article, Vandervort states that “Canadian law requires affirmative sexual
consent to all sexual activity, not merely between strangers. Sexual consent is defined as the
communication, by words or conduct, of ‘voluntary agreement’ to a specific sexual activity, with a specific
person.” Lucinda Vandervort, Sexual Consent as Voluntary Agreement: Tales of “Seduction” or
Questions of Law?, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 143, 146 (2013) [hereinafter Vandervort, Sexual Consent as
Voluntary Agreement]. That description does not claim that consent must be unambiguous. Id.
66. No Canadian cases directly state that affirmative consent must be communicated clearly or
unequivocally.
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Many advocates67 as well as critics68 of affirmative consent seem to
share the view that affirmative consent means unambiguous consent.
Commentators discussing recent campus sexual assault policies shift from
one policy to another without noting the significant difference that some
policies require only affirmative consent whereas others require clear or
unambiguous consent.69
This understanding can be traced back to Stephen Schulhofer, an early
proponent of an affirmative consent standard.70 Schulhofer has repeatedly
proposed a consent standard requiring both elements: an affirmative
indication of agreement (as opposed to an affirmative indication of
disagreement) and that the affirmative agreement be expressed clearly or
unequivocally.71
Schulhofer argued that to adequately protect female sexual autonomy,
“[c]onsent for an intimate physical intrusion into the body should mean in
sexual interactions what it means in every other context–affirmative
permission clearly signaled by words or conduct.”72 He recognized that
“[t]here are many ways to make permission clear without verbalizing the
word ‘yes,’ . . . [b]ut permission must be an affirmative indication of actual
willingness. Silence and ambivalence are not permission.”73 “Clear proof of
an unequivocal ‘no’ should not be required.”74
Schulhofer further explained his proposal in his influential book,
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law.75 Here,
67. See Sarah Croskery-Hewitt, Rethinking Sexual Consent: Voluntary Intoxication and Affirmative
Consent to Sex, 26 N.Z. U. L. REV. 614, 631 (2015) (“[C]onsent should be defined positively in a manner
that incorporates ideas such as free, conscious, voluntary and affirmative agreement. . . . [A]n affirmative
standard emphasizes the need for consent to be a positive act, manifested through clear words or overt
actions . . . .”); Beatrice Diehl, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty, 28 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 503, 511 (2015) (referring to affirmative consent as requiring proof of “affirmative and
clear consent”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453,
1476 (2014) (describing the SlutWalk movement’s advocacy of a standard requiring a clear indication of
consent as an affirmative consent standard).
68. Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 263–
64 (2015) (“[ALI Draft] Section 213.4 is an ‘embrace of an affirmative-consent requirement.’ It makes
clear that no one should feel entitled to sex unless one’s partner gives clear indications of consent.”)
(footnote omitted); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex,
and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 848 (2008) (“What is affirmative consent? It is a rule of
law proposed by a number of male and female academics that would criminalize sexual penetration not
preceded by real and very clear consent . . . .”).
69. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 10, at 1979–80 (quoting California’s standard and then New
York’s standard without noting that New York adds the significant additional requirement that the
agreement be clear).
70. See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND
THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995).
71. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 272–73; Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2175.
72. Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 70.
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Schulhofer can be faulted for failing to consistently recognize the conceptual
difference between affirmative and unambiguous consent.76 There is nothing
conceptually mistaken about proposing a standard that combines both of
these elements. But it is a mistake to assume that the term “affirmative” also
connotes “unambiguous.”
Schulhofer defined consent as “actual words or conduct indicating
affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”77 This
standard requires an affirmative signal of agreement but, as stated, does not
contain a requirement that the signal be unambiguous. Yet, Schulhofer
proceeded as if this standard includes that requirement, conflating affirmative
and unambiguous consent. He argued that the law should move away from
requiring an affirmative “no” “and insist instead that the man have
affirmative indications that she chose to participate. So long as a person’s
choice is clearly expressed, by words or conduct, her right to control her
sexuality is respected.”78 Referring to conduct that might indicate agreement,
Schulhofer states, “Only unambiguous body language should suffice to signal
affirmative consent, of course.”79
This repeated conflation of the concept of affirmative consent and
unambiguous consent has persisted in both critical and supportive
commentary, and it also seems to have created confusion in the standard
universities around the country are adopting.80
Following Schulhofer’s lead, commentators discussing affirmative
consent often assume, without explanation, that affirmative consent includes
a requirement of unambiguous consent.81 To be fair, many of these
commentators are discussing Schulhofer’s proposal or others like it that do
explicitly require an unambiguous signal of agreement.82 Thus, it is
reasonable for them to analyze not just the affirmative component of
Schulhofer’s standard but also the unambiguous component.83 But,
regardless of what proposal is under consideration, it is critical to maintain
the conceptual understanding that the term affirmative itself does not mean
unambiguous.84

76. See id.
77. Id. at 283.
78. Id. at 272–73 (second emphasis added).
79. Id. at 272.
80. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (describing the resulting confusion in university
affirmative consent policies).
81. See Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181; see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 283 (discussing
a requirement of affirmative, but not unambiguous, consent); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 317, 397 (2000) (equating Schulhofer’s proposed affirmative consent reform with the
standard adopted in the M.T.S. case, even though Schulhofer advocates for “clear and unequivocal”
affirmative consent whereas M.T.S. does not require that).
82. See generally Bryden, supra note 81, at 396.
83. See id. at 393–97.
84. See Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181.
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This mistake is very prevalent in the media where journalists regularly
state or assume that all affirmative consent policies require that agreement be
unambiguous.85 An article from the website Inside Higher Ed incorrectly
quoted the standard from the draft California legislation, which required
unambiguous agreement, as being the actual standard signed into law, which
does not require unambiguous consent.86
The failure to be clear about the difference between affirmative and
unambiguous consent has resulted in confusion in university affirmative
consent policies. Most commentary on the recent trend of affirmative
consent policies at colleges and universities is either generally positive or
generally negative.87 These commentators fail to appreciate what appears to
be a very considerable difference: some university policies require that
consent be affirmative but say nothing about consent being unambiguous,
whereas other policies require that consent be both affirmative and
unambiguous. Finally, some university policies blend the two approaches in
a particularly confusing way.88
California’s law states, “‘Affirmative consent’ means affirmative,
conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity.”89 Neither
that sentence nor later sentences contain any language requiring that the
affirmative consent be unambiguous or unequivocal.90 A number of other
universities have similar policies.91

85. See, e.g., Jenée Desmond-Harris, Yes Means Yes: California’s New Sexual Assault Law,
Explained, VOX (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/9/6951409/yes-means-yescalifornias-new-sexual-assault-law-explained (claiming that under California’s policy, “if both people
didn’t make it absolutely clear that they consented to their sexual encounter, the college can find that the
person who didn’t consent was assaulted. . . . In other words, did she either say ‘yes’ or make it very clear
that she meant ‘yes’?”); Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” Is a Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It,
VOX (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terriblebill-and-i-completely-support-it (claiming that the California university policy, which does not contain a
“clear” or “unambiguous” requirement, means that “[t]he Yes Means Yes law could also be called the
You Better Be Pretty Damn Sure law”); Maura Lerner, University of Minnesota to Adopt ‘Affirmative
Consent’ Rule for Sex Partners, STARTRIBUNE (July 7, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.startribune.com/
university-of-minnesota-to-adopt-affirmative-consent-rule/311650821/ (noting that the University of
Minnesota is “joining a national movement” to require affirmative consent and comparing its policy to
California’s—notwithstanding the fact that California does not require unambiguous consent and the
University of Minnesota does).
86. Jake New, The ‘Yes Means Yes’ World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-affirmative-consent-sexualassault-policies (reporting that under California’s bill, as signed by Governor Brown, “[c]onsent is now
‘an affirmative, unambiguous, and conscious decision by each participant to engage in mutually
agreed-upon sexual activity’”). The legislation as enacted does not use the term “unambiguous.” Id.
87. See id. (noting commentary both in support of the recent trends and from those who believe that
commentary to be absurd).
88. See generally OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3.
89. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California
Education Code).
90. See id.
91. See supra Section II.B.
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In contrast, the University of Minnesota’s policy defines affirmative
consent as the “informed, freely and affirmatively communicated willingness
to participate in sexual activity that is expressed by clear and unambiguous
words or actions.”92 A number of other universities have policies that also
contain the term unambiguous or some equivalent term.93
Finally, New York’s state policy is an example of a policy that first
defines affirmative consent without any reference to requiring clear or
unambiguous consent but then proceeds in a following sentence to add a
requirement that the consent be “clear.”94 New York starts by defining
affirmative consent as “a knowing, voluntary, and mutual decision among all
participants to engage in sexual activity.”95 This language, which is similar
to California’s, does not use language meaning clear or unequivocal. In the
next sentence, however, the New York policy adds that “[c]onsent can be
given by words or actions, as long as those words or actions create clear
permission regarding willingness to engage in the sexual activity.”96 This
seems to add a requirement that the agreement not only be affirmative but
also that it be clear, which is a different concept.
New York’s choice of language here shares a similarity with
Schulhofer’s early proposal and can be criticized on the same ground: for
conflating affirmative and clear.97 As noted above, one of Schulhofer’s
definitions of affirmative consent is “actual words or conduct indicating
affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”98 He
then states that this standard presents the question of whether “a person’s
choice is clearly expressed, by words or conduct.”99
The ALI’s April affirmative consent proposal used the term “positive”
rather than “affirmative.”100 This is a notable distinction. While university
policies use a variety of definitions of affirmative consent, none of those
listed in Part II use the term “positive.” As Kevin Cole explains, the phrase
“positive agreement” has some ambiguity.101 The ALI proposal did not
define positive agreement, but some definitions of “positive” indicate that the
term means “expressed clearly” or without “reservation.”102 Cole thus
discusses the possibility that positive agreement might require some level of
92. See Appendix to Policy: Affirmative Consent, University Policy Library, U. MINN., https://policy.
umn.edu/operations/sexualassault-appa (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).
93. See supra Section II.B.
94. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3.
95. Id.
96. Definition of Affirmative Consent, supra note 39 (emphasis added).
97. Id.; see Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2181.
98. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 283.
99. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
100. Cole, supra note 32 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. Discussion Draft No. 2,
2015)).
101. Cole, supra note 33 (manuscript at 21–22).
102. Id. at 22–25, 22 n.40 (quoting Positive, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1993)).
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enthusiasm from the consenting party or some level of certainty by the other
party, and he criticizes the draft for failing to offer clarity on these points.103
While the term “positive” may sometimes connote clearly or
unambiguously, the term “affirmative” does not. Accordingly, campus
university policies that require consent to be affirmative do not contain this
potential textual ambiguity.
Ultimately, my purpose here is neither to advocate for the affirmative
standard versus the unambiguous standard nor is it to discern precisely what
it would mean to require consent to be not only affirmative but also
unambiguous.104 Rather, the point is to highlight the conceptual difference
between those two concepts and to call on advocates, critics, and other
commentators to be explicit about which definition of affirmative consent
they are defending or attacking.
D. Affirmative Consent and the Ongoing Shift from “No” to “Yes”
Advocates of affirmative consent routinely state that under existing law,
the complainant must prove some clear act of disagreement (“no”), whereas
under an affirmative consent standard, the focus “shifts” to whether the
defendant received an affirmative signal of agreement (“yes”).105 This seems
103. Id. at 21–25.
104. For example, in another context (asserting Miranda rights in police interrogations), the Supreme
Court has required that invocations must be unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459
(1994) (discussing that a suspect must “unambiguously request counsel” to properly invoke the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel during an interrogation); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.9(g), at 371 (4th ed. 2004) (“Ambiguous, Equivocal, Limited and Untimely Assertions
of Rights.”). This rule means that there are many cases in which suspects make some affirmative signal
regarding their right to remain silent or right to counsel, and yet, that signal is not sufficiently clear or
unambiguous to qualify as an effective invocation. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra (“[A] statement that
is much more limited by expressing an unwillingness to respond to a particular interrogator (e.g., ‘I don’t
want to talk to you guys’), or an unwillingness to discuss the matter at a particular time (e.g., not ‘right
now’), an unwillingness or inability to respond to a particular inquiry (e.g., ‘You’ve done asked me a
question I can’t answer’) is not a general claim of the privilege.”).
105. An Act Concerning Affirmative Consent: Hearing on H.B. 5376 Before the Comm. on
Higher Educ. & Emp’t Advancement, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Ct. 2016) (testimony of Deb Heinrich, Director of
Policy and Public Relations), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/HEDdata/Tmy/2016HB-05376-R000301Deb%20Heinrich,%20Director%20of%20Policy%20and%20Public%20Relations%20Connecticut%20
Alliance%20to%20End%20Sexual%20Violence%20(formerly%20CONNSACS)-TMY.PDF
(“Affirmative consent is a shift from ‘no means no’ to ‘yes means yes.’ While ‘no means no’ places the
burden on the victim to actively resist, ‘yes means yes’ engages both partners in a dialogue about what
they want and about actively seeking consent.”); Desmond-Harris, supra note 85 (“[E]mphasizing that the
law is a departure from the more common approach to sexual assault allegations, which is to ask if the
alleged victim ever said ‘no.’ . . . It simply changes the nature of topic about which the accused and accuser
are testifying. In the criminal context, the question the court asks is generally ‘Did she say no?’ In the
California college campus context, that will change to ‘Did she say yes?’”); Humphrey, supra note 10, at
55 (“At educational institutions across the nation, the affirmative consent standard shifts the burden during
a campus disciplinary board’s investigation and adjudication of sexual misconduct allegations. Instead of
asking a sexual assault complainant if he or she said ‘no’ during the sexual encounter, under an affirmative
consent standard, the questioning is directed toward the accused and becomes a matter of whether the
alleged victim actually expressed a ‘yes.’”) (footnote omitted); Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means
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to be another major concern behind the drive for affirmative consent
policies.106
Several significant clarifications are needed to understand this shift—
and to what degree it represents a shift at all.
The first clarification involves distinguishing practice from doctrine. In
practice, it may be true that some prosecutors, judges, and juries are reluctant
to find guilt in cases involving a complainant who is silent or passive rather
than one who affirmatively expresses her nonconsent.107 This practice
question is different, however, from the substance of the existing legal
doctrine.
The second clarification is understanding the actual state of the doctrine.
Doctrinally, it is no longer generally true to state that the law requires an
affirmative expression of nonconsent (“no”). The shift from “no” to “yes”
has mostly already occurred, regardless of whether jurisdictions use the
phrase “affirmative consent.” The change from “no” to “yes” in rape and
sexual assault law has been underway for decades as courts have steadily
abandoned and rejected any rule that requires the complainant to express a
“no” or offer “verbal resistance.”
On the first point, it may be true that the criminal justice system
sometimes requires the complainant to prove some clear act of disagreement
(“no”) to proceed with a rape prosecution or conviction. It is difficult to
assess how often, as a matter of practice, police, prosecutors, judges, or juries
require clear evidence of a “no” from the complainant.
If a complainant explains to police or prosecutors that she did not say
anything (and thus did not say “no”) during a sexual encounter, then the
police or prosecutor may use that fact as a reason not to prosecute the case.
Some may refuse to prosecute because they believe that a failure to say “no”
means the complainant actually wanted to have sex at the time and only later
felt regret.108 Some may refuse to prosecute because even though they
believe the complainant did not consent, they believe (falsely) that the law
requires affirmative nonconsent.109 Some may refuse to prosecute because
even though they know that the law does not require affirmative nonconsent,
they nonetheless believe that a factfinder (judge or jury) will refuse to convict
without clear evidence of nonconsent.110

No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1347 (2005) (“The traditional system works on the assumption that consent can be
presumed unless withdrawn by the women. The victim is therefore required to demonstrate to the jury’s
satisfaction that she made the man aware that she did not wish to engage in sexual intercourse. Under an
affirmative consent standard, the law presumes that a woman does not grant consent unless she is asked.”).
106. See sources cited supra note 105.
107. See sources cited supra note 105.
108. Little, supra note 105, at 1358.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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In addition to the role of the police and prosecutor, factfinders (judges
or juries) may refuse to convict in a rape or sexual assault case in which the
victim does not clearly express her disagreement (“no”).111 In part, this may
stem from confusion about the legal standard because jury instructions in
rape and sexual assault cases often do not offer much explanation of what
constitutes consent.112
A final confounding factor is that in many American jurisdictions, sex
without consent simpliciter is not a crime.113 Instead, the prosecution must
prove an additional element, such as force or threat of force.114 Thus, in many
cases in which the complainant was passive, the most difficult problem in
obtaining a conviction is not the consent requirement but the force or threat
of force requirement.115
In short, as a description of how the legal process sometimes works, it
is no doubt true that in some cases, the complainant must prove some clear
act of disagreement for the prosecutor to prosecute the case and obtain a
conviction.
In another sense, however, the claim that the law requires an affirmative
“no” is false in many jurisdictions—false as a description of the doctrinal
law.116 Some of this is a chronological issue. Traditionally, the law was clear
that the prosecution in a rape case had to prove affirmative nonconsent

111. See Cole, supra note 33 (manuscript at 33).
112. See id. at 58.
113. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1000–01
(1998). There are a few states that criminalize “sex without consent” without additionally requiring force
or some additional element. Id.
114. Id.
115. For evidence of the difficulty of prosecuting acquaintance rape cases, see Donald Dripps, After
Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV.
957, 971–72 (2008) (canvassing evidence); and see also Schulhofer, supra note 70, at 2184 (“[O]ne thing
missing in the law of rape is some way to punish sexual misconduct that is not physically violent. It is as
if we had a law against armed robbery but no law against theft. The way to fill that gap is not to try
expanding what we mean by force but to have statutes punishing, as an offense distinct from forcible rape,
any sexual imposition without valid consent.”). Many of the most notorious rape cases involving reversed
convictions in which many commentators believe the evidence was sufficient to prove forcible rape
involve courts finding insufficient evidence of force, not nonconsent. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d
624, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (reversing a rape conviction by concluding there was insufficient
evidence of force), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981) (reversing the appellate court and affirming the
defendant’s conviction); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (N.C. 1984) (reversing a rape conviction by
concluding there was insufficient evidence of force); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1352
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (reversing the defendant’s conviction by concluding there was insufficient evidence
of force), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1998). Alston, Rusk, and Berkowitz are all used
in Joshua Dressler and Stephen P. Garvey’s textbook on criminal law. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P.
GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 397, 409, 419 (6th ed. 2012). Alston has been cited
in at least eighty law review articles, Rusk in over one hundred, and Berkowitz in at least fifty-nine. See
WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (login and search required).
116. See cases cited infra note 124 (describing rape cases that were successfully prosecuted without
affirmative nonconsent).
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(“no”).117 The older the case, the more likely for it to reflect this view; more
recent decisions have repudiated many of those older cases.118 A few
jurisdictions, such as Idaho, still explicitly require some express verbal or
physical resistance to prove forcible rape.119 And there are a few recent cases
suggesting that evidence of the complainant remaining passive and silent as
well as failing to resist or manifest nonconsent is insufficient to show
nonconsent.120
But in recent years, there are many more cases—including cases in
jurisdictions that have not adopted affirmative consent standards and that still
require both force and nonconsent—in which rape or sexual assault
convictions are affirmed on evidence of a purely passive complainant who
did not affirmatively register her disagreement.121 For example, in People v.
Iniguez, a 1994 case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a conviction
for forcible rape when the complainant was awoken by the defendant soon
117. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 83 A. 1083, 1084 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1912) (“If sexual
intercourse is obtained by milder means, or with the consent or silent submission of the female, it cannot
constitute the crime of rape in contemplation of law.”); State v. Green, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 255, 258
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1860) (“And as the State is required to prove the absence of consent, in order to make out
guilt, a prosecution will generally be defeated by evidence of acquiescence. . . . In such case, passive
submission is evidence of acquiescence.”); Stringer v. State, 278 S.W. 208, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925)
(reversing a rape conviction due to the failure to give an instruction that “[m]ere intercourse, coupled with
passive acquiescence, is not rape by force. There must be resistance upon the part of the alleged raped
female . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (rejecting earlier cases that required
active disagreement and resistance, and stated that “[a]ny consent of the woman, however reluctant, is
fatal to a conviction for rape,” and noting that “[w]e expressly disapprove and will not in the future apply
this and similar language used in these and other cases, because such language is on its face plainly
inconsistent with the principle that lack of resistance, induced by fear, is not legally cognizable consent
but is force”).
119. See State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 229 (Idaho 2013) (“We hold that there is insufficient evidence
to support a charge of forcible rape based on Count II. By her own admission, [the victim] ‘didn’t respond’
physically, or even verbally, to Jones’ advances on May 28—she ‘just froze.’ Idaho’s forcible rape statute
expressly requires resistance.”).
120. See United States v. Inlow, ARMY 20070239, 2009 WL 6842640, at *5 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June
15, 2009) (“The second difference concerns [the victim’s] resistance, or lack thereof. Unlike their first
sexual encounter, during the second incident [the victim] did not physically or verbally manifest a lack of
consent to the sexual intercourse between her and appellant. Rather, [the victim] just passively laid in bed
during the second act of sexual intercourse because she thought she did something the night before to
‘deserve what was going on.’ . . . We are mindful that the government need not prove resistance as an
element of rape, but a lack of resistance may be probative on the issue of consent.”); Travis v. State, 98
A.3d 281, 291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (“Subsection (a)(1)—‘by force, or the threat of force, without
consent of the other’—deals with an act of sexual intercourse committed on a victim who is both conscious
and competent. Such a victim must make a choice: ‘Yes, I will’ or ‘No, I won’t.’ The very reason that
the elements of ‘force’ or ‘threat of force’ are a part of (a)(1), but not a part of (a)(2) or (a)(3), is that in
the case of a conscious and competent victim, mere passivity on the victim’s part will not establish the
absence of consent. The law looks for express negation or implicit negation as evidenced by some degree
of physical resistance or an explanation of why the will to resist was overcome by force or fear of harm.”)
(emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., State v. Leon, No. 1 CA–CR 10–0519, 2011 WL 2517325, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June
23, 2011) (describing a case in which the victim did not affirmatively register her disagreement); State v.
Stevens, 53 P.3d 356, 365 (Mont. 2002).
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before he began having sex with her.122 The court found sufficient evidence
of nonconsent even though the complainant remained entirely silent and
passive throughout.123
There are quite a few cases—from a variety of jurisdictions that have
not claimed to adopt affirmative consent definitions—demonstrating
successful prosecutions of rape and sexual assault charges in cases in which
the victim remained silent and passive and did not affirmatively state or
indicate “no.”124
This trend is particularly notable in a recent case from New
Hampshire.125 New Hampshire’s aggravated felonious sexual assault statute
appears to require proof that the complainant affirmatively said “no” or
otherwise indicated her disagreement with sexual activity.126 The statute
provides that
A person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault if
such person engages in sexual penetration with another person under . . . the
following circumstances:
....
122. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 1994).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Datz, 61 M.J. 37, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (reviewing a conviction of rape
in a case in which the complainant remained passive and did not affirmatively say no, reversing the
conviction due to evidentiary errors, and declining to address the sufficiency of the evidence); United
States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432, 433–34 (C.M.A. 1992) (affirming a conviction of forcible rape when the
evidence showed that the complainant did not affirmatively agree or disagree); United States v. Kinney,
ARMY 9800451, 2000 WL 35801741, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 6, 2000), aff’d, 56 M.J. 354
(C.A.A.F. Feb. 7, 2002) (affirming a conviction of forcible rape when the complainant testified that she
did not consent and also testified that she did not say “no” or “stop” or yell out during the encounter);
Leon, 2011 WL 2517325, at *3 (affirming a conviction of sexual intercourse without consent when the
defendant engaged in sex with the complainant “without consent or an indication of consent,”
notwithstanding testimony that the complainant “did not object or say no”); Stevens, 53 P.3d at 365
(affirming the convictions of sexual assault without consent, rejecting the defendant’s argument “that
since the victims in this case failed to ‘communicate’ their dissatisfaction when he initiated sexual contact
during the massage, he could not have possibly known that they did not find the contact ‘agreeable,’” and
agreeing with the prosecution’s claim that “the victims’ testimony that they ‘froze’ out of fear indicated
they did not consent to [defendant’s] sexual contact”); State v. Krieger, No. COA12–730, 2012 WL
6591662, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012) (affirming a rape conviction in a case in which the defendant
grabbed the victim at a park and engaged in various sex acts with her, and the victim “did not cry or scream
because she ‘was frozen in shock and fear’”); State v. El-Berri, No. 89477, 2008 WL 2764873, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 17, 2008) (sustaining a conviction of forcible rape in a case in which the complainant
remained entirely passive during the encounter, never affirmatively indicating her willingness or
unwillingness to sex); State v. Neubauer, 162 P.3d 1044, 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a conviction
of sexual intercourse without consent, even though the complainant testified that “[she] didn’t actually
say no”); Holden v. Commonwealth, No. 2245–97–2, 1998 WL 345525, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 30,
1998) (affirming a conviction of forcible sodomy in a case in which the complainant “neither protested
nor resisted” but “pretended to be asleep” during the sexual encounter “because she was ‘scared to move
or do anything’”); State v. Pitmon, 379 P.2d 922, 923–24 (Wash. 1963) (discussing the complainant’s
testimony that established she was terrified, played a passive role, and did not resist or verbally disagree;
the conviction of rape was affirmed).
125. State v. Lisasuain, 117 A.3d 1154, 1159 (N.H. 2015).
126. Id. at 1158–59.
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. . . When at the time of the sexual assault, the victim indicates by speech
or conduct that there is not freely given consent to performance of the sexual
act.127

In New Hampshire v. Lisasuain, the defendant—a forty-six-year-old
man—performed oral sex and digital penetration on a fourteen-year-old
girl.128 The defendant, Lisasuain, was a friend of the family who had been
staying at the girl’s home.129 While the girl was lying on the couch watching
television, Lisasuain began giving her a foot rub.130 He then began sucking
her toes, and the complainant was “in shock.”131 He told her she was
“dangerously beautiful” and eventually got down on his knees.132 He asked
her “if he could go lower,” and the complainant “assumed that he was talking
about [her] vagina.”133 Throughout, she said nothing and did not answer
because she “couldn’t believe what was going on.”134 The defendant then
removed her pants and underwear, performed oral sex on her, and penetrated
her vagina with his fingers.135
The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that
“the victim indicate[d] by speech or conduct that there [was] not freely given
consent to performance of the sexual act” because “the victim did not testify
that she pushed the defendant away or told him to stop or took any other kind
of affirmative action to express that consent was not freely given.” 136 The
defendant argued “that the legislature ‘has chosen only to criminalize sexual
penetration where there is an affirmative statement of non-consent, rather
than criminalizing sexual penetration unless there is an affirmative statement
of consent’”—a fairly reasonable argument in light of the language of New
Hampshire’s statute.137 The defendant argued that the State was required to
prove “‘that the victim somehow, through verbal or physical action,
communicate[d] her lack of consent,’ and that the ‘legislature did not enact a
statute that makes passive silence stand for lack of consent.’”138
The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed.139 The court effectively
reasoned that the victim’s failure to respond was in fact an indication of
nonconsent: “[I]n failing to respond in any way, [the victim] indicated that

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(m) (2007).
Lisasuain, 117 A.3d at 1157.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157–58.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id. at 1160.
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she did not consent to the sexual assaults by the defendant.”140 Thus, the
court affirmed the defendant’s conviction.141
The Lisasuain decision is a particularly striking example of the trend
away from requiring affirmative evidence of nonconsent because it involved
a state statute that plausibly appeared to require just that.142 Even given such
a statute, the New Hampshire Supreme Court construed the statute to permit
a finding of nonconsent even when the victim remained entirely silent and
passive.143
It is thus increasingly inaccurate to claim that courts require the
prosecution in rape or sexual assault cases to show some affirmative
disagreement or verbal resistance, and that is true even in jurisdictions that
do not claim to have adopted an affirmative consent standard.
The upshot of this discussion is that an affirmative consent standard
does not represent a meaningful departure from the existing law of consent
in most jurisdictions. At most, it may serve as a helpful clarification,
reminding judges and jurors that the prosecution is not required to prove
some affirmative indication of nonagreement and that purely silent or passive
behavior standing alone is not sufficient to infer consent.
To the extent that the criminal justice system does require a complainant
to show a clear “no,” that problem mostly lies with police, prosecutors,
judges, or juries, who may be reluctant to investigate, prosecute, or convict
(respectively) without some clear expression of nonconsent by the
complainant. Thus, a doctrinal reform misses the mark—the target of reform
should be changing prosecutorial and police policies and training, as well as
improving jury instructions and juror training.
In the few jurisdictions that do continue to require some affirmative
showing of disagreement by the complainant, an affirmative consent standard
(like those in New Jersey, Wisconsin, and other states) would be a
meaningful reform. In most other jurisdictions, this doctrinal transformation
has already occurred. A clear statutory definition of consent, requiring some
act or indication of agreement, would be a useful clarification of the law but
not a significant change from existing doctrine.
E. The Role of Silence in Affirmative Consent: An Ambiguous Standard
A major component of affirmative consent standards is the role of
silence or passivity in consent.144 This issue seems to be one of the primary

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1160.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1154–60; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978–79.
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purposes of enacting an affirmative consent standard.145 As noted above,
Michelle Anderson explained,
Affirmative consent is the notion that mere passivity or acquiescence to the
will of another does not constitute meaningful permission to engage in
sexual penetration. Meaningful consent must be active, and a person should
have to communicate positive, verbal or nonverbal agreement to engage in
penetration before someone else should be allowed to penetrate them.146

Affirmative consent policies routinely contain language indicating
consent cannot be inferred from silence or passivity. California’s policy
states, “Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence
mean consent.”147 New York’s policy states, “Silence or lack of resistance,
in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent.”148
These statements are often ambiguous and therefore difficult to assess.
There are at least two possible interpretations of statements indicating that
“silence does not mean consent”:
1. Silence or absence of resistance is irrelevant to determining consent
and cannot be considered in determining consent (Statement (1).
2. Silence or absence of resistance, standing alone, does not suffice to
establish consent (Statement (2).
Statement (1) would be a very significant change to rape law, but it is
hard to understand how this interpretation would actually function.
Moreover, none of the advocates of affirmative consent policies seem to
advance this claim. Statement (2) is far more plausible but is, at most, a
modest clarification of existing law.
The first issue is whether the text of various affirmative consent policies
embody Statement (1) or Statement (2). Some policies, like New York’s,
explicitly state the latter rather than the former by including language
clarifying that silence “standing alone” or “in and of itself” does not show
consent.149
145. See Lisasuain, 117 A.3d at 1154–60; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978–79.
146. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1978; see also Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual Consent in Canadian
Law, supra note 65, at 402 (“When consent is defined as the communication of express voluntary
agreement, neither passivity, submission, silence, nor refusal constitutes consent for the purposes of proof
of the actus reus. Facts that show the complainant was passive, submitted, said nothing by means of either
words or gestures, or refused to comply with the assailant’s requests do not show that the complainant
voluntarily agreed to anything.”).
147. See S.B. 967, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (adding § 67386 to the California
Education Code).
148. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 38, at 3.
149. Id. (“Students should understand that consent may not be inferred from silence, passivity, or lack
of active resistance alone.”); Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to
Title IX, supra note 36.
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Other policies do not contain similar language but simply state that
silence “does not imply consent”150 or “cannot be interpreted as [c]onsent.”151
These policies are ambiguous as to whether they embody Statements (1) or
(2).152 They do not contain clear language stating that silence is irrelevant or
cannot be considered at all in determining consent, and they do not contain
language clarifying that silence “alone” is insufficient to show consent.153
If these policies are interpreted to mean that silence or passivity are
irrelevant or cannot be considered at all in assessing consent, then the
standard quickly becomes unworkable unless both parties are constantly
repeating signals of consent—an approach that no recent defenders of
campus affirmative consent policies have endorsed or defended. In many of
even the most clearly consensual sexual encounters—in which the parties
have voluntarily, unequivocally, enthusiastically, and affirmatively
expressed their agreement to engage in sex—there are periods of time during
which one or both partners may be temporarily passive and thus not actively
signaling agreement. During such periods, both parties assume, reasonably,
that earlier expressions of agreement remain in force unless something
happens to suggest agreement may no longer be present. The parties’ silence
and passivity during such periods, absent some indication of nonconsent, are
reasonably interpreted in light of the clear, voluntary, and enthusiastic
agreement of moments earlier as indicating continued consent.
A rule to the contrary—that silence or passivity are irrelevant and cannot
be considered at all—would require both parties to a sexual encounter to
continually send active signals of agreement to sex. This seems unworkable
and unrealistic, and does not appear to be advocated by any of the proponents
of affirmative consent standards.
This leaves the first interpretation: silence standing alone is not
sufficient to demonstrate consent, but silence or passivity after active signals
of agreement may be one way to infer ongoing agreement.
This interpretation is both reasonable and plausible and, for some of the
affirmative consent policies, clearly stated by the text.154 It is not, however,
a meaningful change from existing law. At most, this interpretation is a
modest clarification. As such, it is valuable insofar as it may assist juries
who are confused on this point. But it does not significantly change the
existing law of rape and sexual assault because existing doctrinal law, for the

150. See, e.g., GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29, at 10.
151. UNIV. OF HAW., supra note 29, at 8; see also UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36, at 15 (“Consent is
not to be inferred from silence, passivity, or a lack of resistance, and relying on non-verbal communication
alone may not be sufficient to ascertain Consent.”).
152. See generally GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29; UNIV. OF HAW., supra note
29; UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36.
153. See generally GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT OFFICE, supra note 29; UNIV. OF HAW., supra note
29; UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 36.
154. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-120-024 (2016).
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most part, already incorporates this insight that silence standing alone does
not constitute consent.
Distinguishing Statement (1) from Statement (2) is important, in part,
because of the vastly different significance of those two rules. Defendants
often argue not that the complainant’s silence alone constituted her consent
to sex but that the complainant’s silence or passivity in combination with
earlier words, conduct, or both constituted consent.155 A few jurisdictions
affirmatively require sexual assault victims to express disagreement.156 In
those jurisdictions, silence alone does mean consent.157 But there are many
more cases upholding rape and sexual assault convictions—and finding
sufficient evidence of nonconsent—when the complainant was passive and
silent.158
In many cases, however, the dispute is not over silence alone but over
the complainant’s silence or passivity when viewed in combination with
earlier words or conduct that the defendant claims indicated affirmative
agreement.159
Michelle Anderson recognized this problem in her critical assessment
of the “no means no” versus “yes means yes” debate.160 In particular,
Anderson highlighted the role of silence under the “yes means yes” model
and noted how similar it is, in many contexts, to the role of silence under the
“no means no” model.161
During a sexual encounter, once there are affirmative signals of
agreement, silence is then often used to infer ongoing consent. For example,
Anderson cited Stephen Schulhofer, the “architect of the Yes Model,” who
notes that “sexual petting” can indicate agreement to sexual penetration.162
Schulhofer stated, “If she doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is combined
with passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching, it is usually sensible
to infer actual willingness.”163 Anderson thus observed that “[w]hen things
heat up, . . . the Yes Model melts into the No Model, in which silence

155. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 234–35 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (“Defendant’s defense
was that he acted under a mistake of fact which negatived his awareness of the lack of consent, i.e., he
acted under the mistaken belief, occasioned by [the victim’s] actions during the day and her failure to say
or do anything during the event, that he had her consent to commit the acts of penetration.”).
156. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases that require verbal
disagreement to prove nonconsent).
157. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts concluded
silence and passivity failed to demonstrate nonconsent).
158. See cases cited supra note 120 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which convictions were
upheld despite the complainant’s silence and passivity).
159. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2005).
160. Id. at 1404–08.
161. See id. at 1404–05.
162. Id. at 1405.
163. SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 272.
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constitutes consent.”164 She argued that this mode of analysis is really no
different from the “no means no” model:
If the woman is silent and fails to say “no,” one may presume she consents
to penetration. What happened to “actual permission” for penetration?
Passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching supply it. Once she
engages in kissing and petting, the No Model supplants the Yes Model, and
verbal resistance is again required.165

Anderson’s criticism here led her to propose a new standard for consent—
the “negotiation model.”166 Discussion of that proposal is beyond the scope
of this Article, which focuses on affirmative consent. For present purposes,
the importance is Anderson’s recognition of the substantial overlap, in many
circumstances, between the No Model and the Yes Model.
In sum, affirmative consent policies suffer from a critical ambiguity
related to the roles of silence or passivity. Whether the affirmative consent
standard claims that “silence is irrelevant to consent” rather than “silence
alone does not equal consent” is often unclear. The former approach would
be radical and unworkable, and perhaps for those reasons, supporters of
affirmative consent policies do not seem to advocate for it. The latter
approach is reasonable but does not represent more than a modest
clarification of most existing doctrines.
In any event, clarity on this point—on the part of both critics and
advocates—would advance the debate over affirmative consent.
F. Affirmative Consent and the Mystery of Sex Without Communication
One significant point of conflict among advocates and critics of an
affirmative consent standard involves criminalizing sex that is “passionately
desired” but not “overtly communicated.”167 Some advocates of an
affirmative consent standard recognize the risk of criminalizing sex in this
circumstance but believe the contrary harm is greater:
Of course, a legal standard requiring the expression of agreement inevitably
makes sexual penetration impermissible in situations where passionate
desire is subjectively present but not overtly communicated. Yet the
contrary standard inevitably has the opposite and far more dangerous effect
of permitting sexual penetration when such intimacy is entirely unwanted.

164. Anderson, supra note 159, at 1405.
165. Id. at 1413.
166. Id. at 1407, 1421–37 (“This Article defines and defends a new model of rape law reform. It
argues that the law should eliminate the requirement of nonconsent. In its place, the law should recognize
the centrality of negotiation, in which individuals would be required to consult with their partners before
sexual penetration occurs.”).
167. See Halley, supra note 49.
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Section 213.2(2) reflects the judgment that the harms that arise under the
latter standard present far greater reason for concern. 168

One critic of the affirmative consent standard called this “an astonishing
passage,” reflecting the idea of “[c]riminal unwantedness.”169
Both sides of this debate are mistaken. Both sides share the view that a
significant number of sexual encounters occur in which both parties
passionately, voluntarily desire to engage in sex, and yet, at least one of the
parties does not communicate this desire to the other party in any way—i.e.,
does not indicate through any affirmative signal his or her interest in sex.
Why either side believes that this is true is unclear. Certainly, people
commonly engage in passionate, voluntary sex without communicating their
consent in any legalistic, formulaic manner.170 Very few sign a consent form
or expressly state, “I hereby consent to engage in the following act of
sex. . . .”171 It may also often be the case that persons in a fully voluntary
sexual encounter do not communicate with one another in ways that are clear
and unambiguous.172
Perhaps, then, this belief that “a legal standard requiring the expression
of agreement inevitably makes sexual penetration impermissible in situations
where passionate desire is subjectively present but not overtly
communicated” stems from conflating the concepts of affirmative and
unambiguous, as discussed above in Section III.C.173 But, as this Article
argues, an affirmative indication of agreement is not the same thing as an
unambiguous indication of agreement.
When persons engage in sexual activity together, they communicate
with one another in a myriad of ways. They use a complex system of words
and conduct. The meaning of those words and that conduct is highly sensitive
to the social context of the communication, the culture or subculture in which
the participants are communicating, and many other factors. This system is
not unique to sex—it is human communication.174
In many “voluntary, desired” sexual encounters, the signals of
agreement are partly or entirely nonverbal. In some cases, those signals are
ambiguous.175 In other cases, the signals may be perfectly clear to the parties

168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. (c)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
169. Halley, supra note 49 (“[I]ts advocates admit that they are willing to endorse the conviction of
people who initiated sexual penetration (and, in the earlier version, contact as innocuous as hand-holding)
with passionately desirous partners who later charge sexual assault.”).
170. See id.
171. See id. But see Should Lovers Sign a Pre-Sex Contract?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.
abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=128101&page=1.
172. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 271–72.
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. (c)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8,
2015).
174. See generally Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1995).
175. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 70, at 271–72.
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in the particular context of their encounter, even if in other contexts those
similar signals would not necessarily signal agreement to sex.176
But there are far fewer cases of voluntary, desired sex in which there are
no affirmative signals of agreement at all. An affirmative consent standard,
unless that standard also dictates the much different requirement of
unambiguous consent, deals only with the latter situation, not the former.177
A fundamental and ongoing difficulty, particularly in acquaintance rape
cases, is adjudicating disputes over the meaning of various signs or signals
in a given social context. Affirmative consent is not a solution to that
problem and does not ameliorate it. Affirmative consent requires that there
be a signal as opposed to relying solely on the absence of any signal. But, in
most cases, the most significant problem is not determining whether there is
“a signal” but in determining what—if anything—different signals mean in
the given social context.
There are at least two significant difficulties in many contested rape or
sexual assault cases: (1) resolving disputes over what actually happened
(what was said and what was done) and (2) resolving disputes over whether
a given set of words or conduct signaled a person’s agreement to engage in
sex.
The first problem is evidentiary and is resolved through rules of
evidence, court procedures, and selection of a factfinder—often a jury in the
United States but sometimes a judge.178 It is common to assert that the
problem of “he said, she said” is particularly acute in rape and sexual assault
cases,179 but it occurs throughout the legal system. Claims of assault and
self-defense routinely require factfinders to adjudicate between two contested
factual claims, both by interested parties, and often without much in the way
of corroborating evidence.180 Courts often adjudicate deadly self-defense
claims on even narrower grounds—with only one “he said” because the
erstwhile narrator of the other side of the story has been killed and cannot
testify.
Moreover, it is far too simplistic to retreat to the view that a rape claim
is no more than a “he said, she said” situation. Police and prosecutors have
many tools at their disposal that they routinely use to test whether self-serving
statements can really be believed—interrogations, the dogged pursuit of

176. See generally Tiersma, supra note 174.
177. See supra Section III.C.
178. See generally C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1982) (discussing the role of the fact finder
in determining “what happened” in cases); Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2007) (discussing the evidentiary rules’ impact on rape trials).
179. See Leigh Gilmore, Stanford Sexual Assault: What Changed with the Survivor’s Testimony,
CONVERSATION (June 16, 2016, 5:55 AM), https://theconversation.com/stanford-sexual-assault-whatchanged-with-the-survivors-testimony-60913.
180. See, e.g., Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476–78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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corroborating or contradictory evidence, and the like.181 One former
prosecutor of rape and sexual assault cases recently asserted, “There is no
such thing as ‘he said, she said.’ There is always something more there.” 182
That may be an overstatement, but it is a healthy corrective to the notion that
most rape cases boil down to “he said, she said.”
In any event, our legal system is routinely tasked with determining
“what happened” in circumstances in which that is a very difficult task. The
ordinary response is to insist on fair procedures and rules of evidence, zealous
advocates, competent judges, and neutral, fair factfinders—and then entrust
the task of determining “what happened” to that system.183
Even after a factfinder determines “what happened,” the second
difficulty in many contested rape and sexual assault cases is determining
what those words or conduct signify or how they should be interpreted.184
An affirmative consent standard neither helps resolve this difficult
problem nor alters the nature of the dispute. In the vast majority of sexual
encounters, including the vast majority of those contested encounters
involving an allegation of rape or sexual assault, some affirmative signal or
signals are sent, or at least claimed to have been sent, between the parties.
Some of those signals are clear and some are not; clarity often comes from
social context. In one situation, leaning back onto a bed during passionate
kissing may be an affirmative indication to proceed further. In another
situation, leaning back may indicate uncertainty, unwillingness, or fear. As
Michelle Anderson has noted, there is substantial evidence that men tend to
misinterpret women’s nonverbal behavior, “imput[ing] erotic innuendo and
sexual intent where there is none.”185
Requiring that there be an affirmative indication of consent does not
solve this puzzle. As Anderson explained, the dilemma remains in most
cases, regardless of whether one requires an affirmative signal of
disagreement (“no”) or an affirmative signal of agreement (“yes”):
Under the No Model, a man may misinterpret a woman’s body language to
mean consent to sexual penetration. He has permission to penetrate her
until she objects. Under the Yes Model, a man may also misinterpret a
woman’s body language to mean consent to sexual penetration when there

181. See generally PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH (Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 4th ed. 2009).
182. Criminal Justice Forum III, CLEV.-MARSHALL C. L. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://mediasite.
ulib.csuohio.edu/Mediasite/Play/2901aa77c9d2479f867cb81f3f9877941d (Statement of Ohio State
Representative Greta Johnson, former prosecutor of rape and sexual assault cases at Cleveland-Marshall
Criminal Justice Forum lecture) (time markers at 24:29–24:35).
183. See Tiersma, supra note 174, at 63–74.
184. See generally Anderson, supra note 10.
185. Anderson, supra note 159, at 1417–20.
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is kissing, hugging, and petting involved. He may then penetrate her until
she objects.186

Stated differently, the problem in these cases is in interpreting the various
signs and signals in a sexual encounter, and therefore, requiring that there be
some affirmative sign or signal will not solve this interpretive difficulty.
Accordingly, requiring that consent be affirmative—that some positive
signal be sent—will impact relatively few cases—only those cases in which
one party to an encounter remains entirely passive and silent. Those cases
are undoubtedly important, but as noted above in Section III.D, many of those
cases are already successfully prosecuted under existing law.
Again, this suggests that the notion of affirmative consent is a modest
and helpful clarification of the existing doctrinal trend. Unless affirmative
consent is also coupled with a requirement to prove unambiguous consent,
however, it is not a radical change in the law of consent.187 Nor would it
result in criminalizing many sexual encounters in which sex is passionately
desired.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the widespread adoption of affirmative consent standards for
campus sexual assault adjudications and the ongoing debate over affirmative
consent, it is critical for both advocates and critics to maintain conceptual
clarity over what the concept of affirmative consent does—and does not—
mean.188 This Article seeks to advance that debate not by taking a side but
by dispelling a number of common misconceptions and by clarifying what is
and is not true under existing law.
The basic concept of affirmative consent simply means that some signal
of agreement must be sent by each party to a sexual encounter.189 This is a
modest requirement and is largely a fait accompli because it appears to reflect
the practice of most American jurisdictions in rape and sexual assault cases.
The concept of unambiguous consent is different from that of
affirmative consent, and this seems to be the source of much of the
uncertainty, unease, and confusion over adopting affirmative consent
policies.190 Advocates should be clear about whether they propose only
affirmative consent or the additional, more radical requirement of
unambiguous consent, and likewise, critics should separate the two concepts.
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See supra Section III.C.
See supra Sections III.A–B.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section III.C.

